Dear Ombudsman Littlewood,

I feel we are a bit crossed up in this process of discussing passage of Plumtree v Defence Force appeal process. This is what I think:

  1. Human Rights Review Tribunal hands down final decision.

  2. Robert Plumtree files an appeal in the Rotorua High Court Registry. (Applicant)

  3. A High Court Judge then sits holding court in a telephone hearing and makes orders including that the applicant file his memo setting out both the parts of the decision, and under what sections of law his appeal relies upon. Also the lady Judge at that hearing referrers the matter for hearing in the Rotorua High Court at the earliest listing date to particularly hear matters in relation to the appellants rights in relation to time.

  4. 16th December Justice Harrison sits
    Upholds the appellant’s pleadings that his application was not filed out of time.
    Justice Harrison states he is not dismissing the appellant’s request for a lawful discharge.
    Justice Harrison also states he thinks the Governor General will now respond much quicker this time Robert.

  5. Justice Harrison writes minute in part stating he can not do any more with the application, if anything in the matter needs to be done it be done by the matter going back to the Human Rights Review Tribunal…

  6. Plumtree seeks leave to appeal Registrar Gribbles written findings. Including request for a copy of transcript to allow construction of his Full Court of Appeal application.

  7. Registrar B Gribble files appeal documents in Rotorua Registry.

  8. Justice Harrison orders Registry not to accept any further correspondence from the appellant.

  9. Motion of Human Rights and Bill of Rights appeal documents blocked most probably caused by a misinterpretation of Harrison J. orders during early passage of the administration process.

  10. Plumtree files complaint with Ombudsman, being a section 13 complaints for consideration by Ombudsman Littlewood.
    In that process-seeking support under the Ombudsman Act, Plumtree intrusts original documents into the care of the Ombudsman for expected Full Court of Appeal hearing, that he believes the Ombudsman’s Act compels the Office of the Ombudsman to act on his behalf in.

BECAUSE Justice Harrison did not hear the listed sections of the HRRT decision that Plumtree sort appeal on e.g. those sections described in law that were filed for appeal at the commencement of proceedings in his High Court Appeal that remain un-heard.


On receipt of transcript an application needs then to be constructed for appeal to the Full Court of Appeal in Wellington pleading compelling reasons for the appellants right to have the High Court properly hear the sections filed for appeal. Maybe then the High Court will give very public consideration to each of the 37 sections filed for appeal and make such comments as it sees fit pertaining to the previous findings made by HRRT in its final decision.
Which is what Robert Francis Plumtree started an appeal process for in the first place.


Well I dunno what you think Ombudsman Littlewood, but that pretty much describes the passage of appeals process that I perceive as being required in appealing a Final Decision of the Human Rights Review Tribunal.

Sensitivity of others feelings is not an aspect of due process as best as I can tell. I believe the appeal process is contained in the High Court Rules and has nothing what so ever to do with  sensitive feelings.

It is not Justice Harrison that is obstructing due process of my appeal. In the first instance in-action of a court official appears one very likely cause. There might be another miss understanding that is also delaying the appeal process…


Kind regards




Christopher Littlewood
Assistant Ombudsman
P.O. Box 13482

Your Ref: C8026
Plumtree v Defence Force

Dear Ombudsman Christopher Littlewood,

Thank you for your correspondence dated 19th April 2004. I advise I had not intended criticism of judicial officers, rather I complain I am being deprived of due-process in accordance with the rules and regulations in law and its administration, which relates particularly to a matter of administration set out in sec.13 (1) of the Ombudsmen Act 1975, being a complaint against a officers inaction in the Department for Courts.


I complain I correctly filed for an appeal for hearing before the Appeals Court against Registrar B Gribble’s findings he found in the decision earlier handed down by the High Court from the hearing held at Rotorua and heard by Justice R Harrison on 16th December 2002.
I correctly filed an application in the Rotorua High Court Registry (Civil Division) and have received an inappropriate response. I have received no appropriate legal response at all. The only response I have thus far received since filing for appeal was a copy of a minute written by the same judge whose decision I sort to appeal.

In brief the facts of this matter are:

During the Human Rights Review Tribunal proceedings a meeting occurred between Defence Force legal Officer, Crown Law Solicitor, Barrister Peter Birks and myself. During that meeting held in the local RSA the Defence Force witness produced forgeries of my signature part of evidence clearly displaying I’d been signed up for an additional year in the army without my knowledge. The witness later repeatedly claimed at the Tribunal hearing, he could not recall producing the documents he had earlier produced at the meeting at Rotorua.

The Human Rights Review Tribunal had prior to the Tribunal hearing, ordered for hearing by all parties during the proceedings, only written submissions filed prior to the hearing could be heard during the proceedings, and the Tribunal had also asked that I file my appeal books three months in advance of the hearing instead of handing them up the usually required day before; I complied.
I believe I received a reasonable hearing of the facts upon which I relied during the first half-day of the Tribunal hearing held before three members. However witness for Defence Force had only filed some thirteen written points in his submissions for his evidence, of those he raised only nine, and went on in breach of Tribunal directions to raise others far in excess of the ones he had filed. I objected and was told words to the effect to sit-down and shut-up, Defence Force witness was then allowed to raise his personal opinion for quite some time, on the first day almost two hours. He went over point-by-point facts I had raised and were in the main facts supported by my army personal file, Lt Col Taylor makes lots of unsubstantiated, false misleading statements over what otherwise the documents produced clearly displayed.

The next full day of hearing held in Auckland, Defence Force and the Tribunal continued to build upon those false misleading explanations of what had occurred. However there was two weeks in-between the two days of hearing and I filed in accordance with law, a written objection, which the Tribunal accepted and upheld in my favour, though later included the disallowed evidence in its decision. Three months later the Tribunal delivered its 35-page decision, and included some findings in that decision from the Defence Force witness, I describe as false and misleading statements given in breach of Tribunal directions.

The Tribunal in its decision gave one award in my favour in relation to vaccination certificates that army held in its procession (clearly forged replacement certificates that displayed many Australian army stamps and I had been given vaccinations the year prior to my enlistment) the tribunal gave the one small award only on the grounds Defence Force had breached the Privacy Act in Defence Force having not produced the certificates on application under freedom of information request.

The Tribunal decision didn’t mention the written evidence I’d submitted in relation to the army arranged sweetheart to write to. During the Tribunal hearing Defence Force witness Lt Col Taylor, made a lot of statements like (a) he didn’t think army actually conducted annual medicals, he only has had one medical in the three years he’s been in the regular force. (b) Being taken of strength and put back on strength was just some usual clerical event, when I had testified that’s what occurred on re-engagement.  (c) During the Tribunal hearings Lt Col Taylor clearly stated the pay book he held in his hand containing a last entry January 1966, was the only pay book found. He still has not sent me the pay-book the Tribunal ordered him to and he later sent me another with first entry January 1967. (d) He Lt Col Taylor repeatedly could not recall the documents he’d produced at the meeting in Rotorua, however Barrister Peter Birks attests otherwise as do I.

The Tribunal made an award in my favour for cost however the witness objected to the amount of ink I had claimed and has refused to pay, so I have received none of the cost both the Tribunal and High Court had awarded.

I appealed the Tribunal decision in the Rotorua High Court, however straightaway the judge (I believe acting with bias) ordered three times that I withdraw my appeal, and because I didn’t want to be judged in contempt of his order I did, the judge then turned around and asked what had I filed. The judge then went on to ask what I wanted and upholds my request for a lawful discharge, and also he to awarded the Tribunal costs in my favour.

Still to this date the Defence Force has not paid the awarded cost or addressed the upheld request for my lawful discharge so I wrote to the Rotorua High Court Registrar and later appealed according to law his reply, which I copied to you displaying what I had done because I have only received the judges minute in response. I did not withdraw, I was ordered to withdraw by that judge, and in any event, he cannot order the registry not to receive documents from me as he did within the minute he wrote, stopping any opportunity for judicial review of his decision of 16th December 2002.


I have noted your comments regarding previous correspondence between your colleagues myself and your further comments in relation to the functions of the Ombudsmen and conclude I have not asked you to investigate in the matters set out in sec.13 (8) (a) or (b) of the Ombudsmen Act 1975, however I am left without any other right of appeal or avenue for objection in these matters, but for sec. 6 and 7 (a) of the Ombudsmen Act 1975, no appeal can now lie in respect to these proceedings, and no proceedings or decision by the Department for Courts lays open to me against there inappropriate response as the no response at all cannot be appealed.


Please can you give consideration to sec.13 (1) and sec. 6 and 7 (a) of the Ombudsmen Act 1975 in choosing to investigate this matter?


I remain, yours truly,


Robert Plumtree